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Abstract 
	  
	  
             This paper examines the relationship between insider ownership and bank performance. We 
use a sample of U.S. Bank Holding Companies in 2005 (before crisis), 2008 (during crisis) and 2011 
(after crisis). We use Tobin’s Q, market-to-book ratio, return on asset and return on equity as the 
dependent variables, and insider ownership as the independent variable in the regressions. We find 
that insider ownership is strongly related to bank performance before the recent financial crisis, but 
unrelated to bank performance during the crisis. 
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1. Introduction 
	  
          A large literature has examined the relationship between insider ownership and firm 
performance, and the results are mixed. The earliest study on this topic dates back to 1932, when 
Berle and Means published the book entitled “The Modern Corporation and Private Property.” They 
argue that when insider ownership is small, the value of the enterprise is likely to be low. 
 
          Subsequent researchers have conducted theoretical analysis. The earliest model is developed by 
Stulz (1988), who shows that firm performance goes up as insider ownership increases, but when 
insider ownership reaches a threshold level, further increase in insider ownership will cause firm 
performance to decline. This happens because too much ownership entrenches managers, and as a 
result entrenched managers are less incentivized to improve firm performance. 
 
          However, some studies find no significant relationship between insider ownership and firm 
performance. For example, Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Palia (1999) find that, after controlling for 
firm fixed effects, changes in managerial ownership do not affect firm performance. 
 
          Researchers have also examined the relationship between insider ownership and bank 
performance, and the results are mixed as well. While some studies find a nonlinear relationship, 
others find a negative relationship. In a recent paper, Aebi, Sabato, Schmid (2011) find that standard 
corporate governance variables such as insider ownership have no impact on bank performance during 
the recent financial crisis. We review the related literature in the next section. 
 
          In this paper, we compare the relationship between insider ownership and bank performance 
before, during, and after the recent financial crisis. We hypothesize that the relationship between 
insider ownership and bank performance depends on outside environment. This relationship could be 
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different before and during the financial crisis, possibly because banks had more exposure to risk 
during the crisis, thus market value reduced. 
 
          In order to test our hypothesis, we use a list of publicly-traded bank holding companies (BHCs) 
from three years: 2005 (before crisis), 2008 (during crisis), and 2011 (after crisis). We measure bank 
performance by using four variables: Tobin’s Q (Q), market-to-book ratio (MB), return on assets 
(ROA) and return on equity (ROE). Q is defined as market value of assets divided by book value of 
assets; MB is defined as market value of equity divided by book value of equity; ROA is defined as 
net income divided by total assets; ROE is defined as net income divided by equity. We measure 
insider ownership using the percentage of shares owned by directors and officers as a group. We use 
the bank size (Size), real estate loans, commercial and industrial loans, consumer loans and deposits 
as control variables. 
 
          Our results can be summarized as follows. Overall, we find no evidence that insider ownership 
is related to bank performance during the crisis. In contrast, we find strong evidence that bank 
performance was significantly positively related to insider ownership before the crisis. After crisis, 
insider ownership was positively related to market value of banks, but unrelated to other measures of 
bank performance. 
 
          The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature. Section 3 
presents the sample and empirical model. Section 4 reports our empirical results. We conclude in 
section 5. 
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2. Literature Review 
 
2.1 Insider ownership and corporate performance 
	  
          Insider ownership and corporate performance has been the focus of a large number of studies. 
The relationship can be traced back to 1932, when Berle and Means published the book entitled “The 
Modern Corporation and Private Property.” Their book first proposed the idea that when insider 
ownership is relatively low, managers are likely to have administrator privileges, and as a result the 
value of the company will be reduced. Since then, a large literature has examined the relationship 
between insider ownership and firm performance, but the results are mixed. 
 
          According to the so-called exogenous view, insider ownership is an independent exogenous 
variable. The earliest modeling about the relationship between insider ownership and corporate 
performance was carried out by Stulz (1988), who found that at first the performance of corporations 
goes up as insider ownership increases, but when insider ownership reaches a certain level, corporate 
performance begins to decline. 
 
          Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) and McConnell and Servaes (1990) found that the 
relationship between insider ownership and corporate performance is nonlinear. This is consistent 
with the model of Stulz (1988). 
 
          Chen, Hexter, and Hu (1993) used Fortune 500 companies in 1976, 1980 and 1984 to study the 
relationship between insider ownership and corporate performance. They found that Tobin's Q is a 
function of managerial ownership. When managerial ownership lies between 0-5%, Tobin's Q rises. 
When the managerial ownership increases to 12%, the value of Tobin's Q starts to decrease. When 
managerial ownership exceeds 12%, the results are sensitive to the sample used. 
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          With regard to the relationship between the company's market value and insider ownership, the 
results are not always consistent. For example, Knoeber and Mehran (1995), Yermack (1996), 
Agrawal (1996), and Keasey (1999) found a positive and significant relationship between insider 
ownership and market value (as measured by Tobin's Q) and accounting performance (as measured by 
ROA). However, Himmelberg et al. (1999) and Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) found no relationship 
between insider ownership and firm performance. 
	  
2.2 Insider ownership and bank performance 
	  
          Following the recent financial crisis, researchers have focused on the effect of corporate 
governance in the banking industry. Most studies examine insider ownership, board structure 
(external and internal directors) and executive compensation. We focus on a specific governance 
mechanism, namely the role of insider ownership (IO) in the bank. This is based on agency theory to 
identify common conflict of interest (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). In their seminal paper, Jensen and 
Meckling argue that insider ownership can reduce conflicts of interest arising from agency costs, and 
have a positive impact on market value. However, the positive impact is up to a threshold, beyond 
which the manager will begin to divert additional revenue, resulting in a nonlinear relationship 
between insider ownership and firm performance. 
 
          Several papers examine insider ownership on bank performance, but the results are mixed. 
Griffith, Fogelberg, and Zhou (2002) found that CEO's ownership and bank performance is a 
nonlinear relationship. Hughes et al. (2003) found that higher insider ownership is often associated 
with worse performance. Belkhir (2004), using a sample of U.S. banks and savings and loan 
associations, found a significant (negative) relationship between insider ownership and market value 
(Tobin's Q). This is consistent with the findings of Hughes et al. (2003). Barako and Tower (2007) 
found that board ownership and performance of government-owned banks are negatively correlated. 
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Researchers have also studied the effect of the controlling shareholders on bank performance. Caprio, 
Laeven and Levine (2007) found that a greater cash flow right owned by the controlling shareholders 
enhances bank valuations. Elyasiani and Jia (2008) found that the stability of institutional ownership 
has a positive impact on bank holding companies’ performance. Westman (2011) used a sample of 
European financial companies (commercial and investment banks and bank holding companies) over 
the period 2003-2006. She found a positive and significant relationship between insider ownership 
and accounting performance. 
 
          Some researchers studied the effect of corporate governance on bank performance during the 
recent financial crisis from 2007 to 2009. Several papers concluded that better-managed banks 
performed better during the crisis. Farm (2009) found that German banks’ loss arose from financial 
incompetence and failure of Supervisory Board. Peni and Vahamaa (2011) found that with better 
corporate governance, banks have higher profitability. Rove et al. (2011) found that corporate 
governance better explains bank loan quality performance.  
 
          Other papers concluded that banks with better corporate governance did not perform better 
during the crisis. Beltratti and Stulz (2011) built a sample of large international banks, and found that 
the shareholder-friendly boards did not performe better during the crisis. Erkens, Hung, and Matos 
(2012) found that banks with more independent boards and higher institutional ownership during the 
crisis had lower stock returns. Aebi, Sabato, Schmid (2011) found the standard corporate governance 
variables had no impact on bank performance during the crisis. 
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3. Data 
	  
3.1 Data sources 
	  
          We start with a list of publicly traded bank holding companies (BHCs) from Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York. We then identify the 200 largest BHCs by market capitalization in 2005 (before 
crisis), 2008 (during crisis) and 2011 (after crisis) from the CRSP database. After that we obtain 
accounting data for each bank from the Federal Reserve's FR-Y9C database. Finally, we obtain 
insider ownership data for each bank from the SEC EDGAR database. 
 
3.2 Measuring bank performance 
	  
          We measure bank performance using Tobin’s Q (Q), market-to-book ratio (MB), return on 
assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE). Q is defined as market value of assets divided by book 
value of assets; MB is defined as market value of equity divided by book value of equity; ROA is 
defined as net income divided by total assets; ROE is defined as net income divided by equity. 
	  
 
3.3 Measuring insider ownership 
	  
          To evaluate the relationship between insider ownership and bank performance, we use the 
percentage of shares owned by directors and officers as a group to define insider ownership. When 
insider ownership is less than 1%, we set it equal to 0.5%. 
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3.4 Control variables 
	  
          We use several control variables in our regressions. These variables are selected following 
previous studies. 
 
          First, we control for size, which is defined as the natural logarithm of assets. It is a major 
variable affecting bank performance. We expect that large banks to have better performance. This is 
because large banks are likely to obtain scale and scope economies, thus exhibiting higher market 
values.  
 
          Second, we control for the shares of real estate loans, commercial and industrial loans, and 
consumer loans in total loans. Finally, we control for the percentage of deposits in total assets. Table 1 
summarizes the definition of variables used in our study. 
	  
3.5 Summary statistics and correlation matrix 
	  
          Since some banks closed down, some banks were taken over and some unfound data, as shown 
in the Tables 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3, our sample finally consists of 167 observations in 2005, 166 
observations in 2008 and 173 observations in 2011. The mean of insider ownership is 0.1254 in 2005, 
0.1107 in 2008 and 0.0979 in 2011, which shows a tendency of decline. Considering the influence of 
crisis for recent years, the economy is in a slump and the market downturn cause the decrease of 
percentage of shares owned by the insiders. The bank size has the bigger standard dividends than 
other variables, which are 1.4516 in 2005, 1.5297 in 2008 and 1.6961 in 2011. The bank size 
increased due to the expansion of bank assets.  
 
          Table 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3 present presents the correlations among various variables. We focus on 
the correlation between independent variable (IO) and dependent variables (Q, MB, ROA, ROE). We 
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find that the correlations between IO and ROA are 0.0698 in 2005, 0.0679 in 2008 and 0.2235 in 2011. 
The correlations between IO and ROE are 0.0242 in 2005, 0.0618 in 2008 and 0.1570 in 2011. We 
conclude that the correlation between IO and ROA and the correlation between IO and ROE are more 
relative after crisis.  
	  
3.6 Regression model 
	  
          As we are interested in understanding the impact of financial crisis on the relationship between 
insider ownership and bank performance, we use data from three years, namely 2005 (before crisis), 
2008 (during crisis) and 2011 (after crisis). The empirical equation is as follows: 
 
performance =α + β ⋅ IOi + γ ⋅ IOi
2 +ω ⋅controlsi + ε i  
 
Where α  is a constant; β , γ  and ω  are coefficient estimates; IO2  is a function of insider 
ownership to check whether the relationship between insider ownership and bank performance is non-
linear (Stulz, 1988; Morck, Shleifer and Vishny, 1988); controls  pertain to bank and characteristics; 
i  refers to a specific bank; and ε i  is the error term. We estimate the equation using the ordinary least 
squares (OLS). 
 
          To allow for the impact of the recent financial crisis on the determinants of bank performance, 
we estimate the model separately for the pre-­‐crisis, during-crisis and after-crisis period.  
	  
4. Empirical results 
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          Table 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 report the regression results for 2005, 2008 and 2011, respectively. In 
each cell, the first line reports the coefficients and the second line reports the standard errors. We 
regard a coefficient with a p-value less than 0.05 to be statistically significant. 
 
4.1 Regression results prior to financial crisis (2005) 
 
          Table 4.1 reports the regression results for the pre-­‐crisis year 2005. In columns (1) and 
(2), the dependent variables are Tobin’s Q and MB, while in columns (3) and (4), the 
dependent variables are ROA and ROE. The definitions of these variables are described in 
Table 1, and they represent the performance of the bank holding companies. 
 
          The coefficients on insider ownership (IO) are positive and significant in all of the 
regressions except ROE, indicating positive correlation between IO and bank performance. 
This result is consistent with a number of recent studies (e.g., Athanasoglou, Brissimis, and 
Delis, 2008; Goddard et al., 2010, 2011; Dietrich and Wanzenried, 2011). The coefficient on 
ROE is not significant, indicating that insider ownership is not well related to return on equity.  
 
          The coefficients on control variables are broadly consistent with our expectation. 
Specifically, in rows (4) and (5), when we regress performance on the control variables 
capital and real estate loans, we find significant association between these variables and bank 
performance, indicated by Tobin’s Q and ROA for capital, and Tobin’s Q, MB ratio, and 
ROE for real estate loan. There’s a difference between the two correlations though, it is that 
capital and performance is positive correlated, while real estate loans and performance is 
negatively correlated.  
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          The coefficients on commercial and industrial loan, consumer loan, and deposits are 
negative but not significant in the Tobin’s Q regressions, but not consistent in the regressions 
on MB ratio, ROA, and ROE. The positive correlation between deposit and ROE indicates 
that banks with a higher proportion of deposits are more profitable. This is consistent with the 
empirical fact that interest rates on deposits are usually lower than those on borrowed funds. 
Taken together, these test results indicate that our regression estimation is well specified. 
 
4.2 Regression results during financial crisis (2008) 
 
          Table 4.2 reports the regression results for the crisis year 2008. The coefficient on 
either insider ownership or insider ownership squared is not significant in any of the 
regressions. Thus, insider ownership is not related to bank performance during the crisis 
period.  
 
          On the other hand, we continue to find a significant negative correlation between 
capital and MB ratio, real estate loans and MB and Tobin’s Q. In particular, we find that size 
has a significant negative correlation with all four-performance measurements. This is 
perhaps because larger banks were more capable of taking risk before the crisis, thus 
investing a large portion of assets in high-risk instruments. When the financial crisis 
happened, they had more exposure to the risk, and became more vulnerable compared to the 
smaller size banks. 
 
          Another interesting finding is that deposits are significantly negatively associated with 
all four performance measurements as well. One possible reason is that when the crisis 
explored, banks could no longer get funded in the market. By increasing interest rates, they 
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could borrow money from depositors, thus making deposits significantly negative correlated 
to bank profitability.  
 
4.3 Regression results after financial crisis (2011) 
 
          Table 4.3 reports the regression results for the after-­‐crisis year 2011. The coefficient of 
insider ownership is positive and significant when ROA is the dependent variable, and 
insignificant when the other three performance measures are dependent variables. These 
results indicate that after the crisis, insider ownership has more influence on the bank 
performance than during the crisis, but the impact is not as significant as it was before the 
crisis.  
 
          The impact of other control variables on bank performance is also weaker compared 
with pre-crisis years. Size has a negative and significant correlation when MB is the 
dependent variable. But there’s no clear pattern for the other regression results. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
          We have examined the effect of insider ownership on bank performance using a panel 
of U.S. bank holding companies in 2005, 2008, and 2011. To control for the impact of the 
recent financial crisis, we run separate regressions for the pre-­‐crisis year 2005, crisis year 
2008 and the post-crisis year 2011. Overall, we find no evidence that insider ownership is 
related to bank performance during the crisis. In contrast, we find strong evidence that bank 
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performance is significant related to insider ownership before the crisis. After crisis, the 
results are mixed, depending on how performance is measured. 
 
          Our results have an important policy implication. Some researchers have argued that 
higher insider ownership can improve bank performance. However, our results show that 
insider ownership has no impact on bank performance during the crisis period, precisely 
when better performance is needed most. Thus, regulators need to consider other measures to 
improve bank performance during a financial crisis. 
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Appendices 
 
	  
Table 1: Definition of variables 
	  
	  
Variables Definition 
  
Tobin’s Q Market value of assets / Book value of assets 
  
Market-To-Book Ratio Market value of equity / Book value of equity 
  
Return On Assets Net income / Total assets 
  
Return On Equity Net income / Equity 
  
Insider Ownership Percentage of shares owned by directors and officers as a group 
  
Size Log (total assets) 
  
Capital Equity / Total assets 
  
Real Estate Loans Real estate loans / Total loans 
  
Commercial and Industrial 
Loans 
Commercial and Industrial loans / Total loans 
  
Consumer Loans Consumer loans / Total loans 
  
Deposits Deposits / Total assets 
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Table 2: Summary Statistics 
	  
 
Table 2.1: 2005 Year 	  	  
 
 Obs. Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
Tobin's Q 167 1.1163 0.1549 0.9578 2.9753 
      
Market-To-Book Ratio 167 2.2106 0.6870 0.4414 4.3515 
      
Return On Assets 167 0.0190 0.0135 -0.0034 0.1725 
      
Return On Equity 167 0.2025 0.0688 -0.0366 0.4112 
      
Insider Ownership 167 0.1254 0.1263 0.0050 0.6910 
      
Size 167 15.8345 1.4516 14.0342 21.1248 
      
Capital 167 0.0955 0.0535 0.0583 0.7078 
      
Real Estate Loans 167 0.6860 0.1877 0.0000 0.9895 
      
Commercial And Industrial Loans 167 0.1672 0.1100 0.0000 0.7476 
      
Consumer Loans 167 0.0818 0.0986 0.0000 0.6958 
      
Deposits 167 0.6914 0.1571 0.0090 0.9048 
 
Notes: Please see Table 1 for definition of variables. 	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Table 2.2: 2008 Year  	  	  
	  	  
Notes: Please see Table 1 for definition of variables. 
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
 Obs. Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
Tobin's Q 166 1.0220 0.0676 0.9046 1.3741 
      
Market-To-Book Ratio 166 1.2437 0.6515 0.1990 3.6043 
      
Return On Assets 166 0.0023 0.0207 -0.1574 0.0589 
      
Return On Equity 166 0.0173 0.2383 -1.8843 0.3410 
      
Insider Ownership 166 0.1107 0.1157 0.0050 0.6720 
      
Size 166 15.7128 1.5297 13.5393 21.5003 
      
Capital 166 0.1017 0.0309 0.0421 0.3807 
      
Real Estate Loans 166 0.7043 0.1646 0.0876 0.9990 
      
Commercial And Industrial Loans 166 0.1747 0.1092 0.0005 0.7222 
      
Consumer Loans 166 0.0623 0.0709 0.0000 0.4776 
      
Deposits 166 0.6853 0.1374 0.0137 0.8935 
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Table 2.3: 2011 Year 
	  
	  
 
      Notes: Please see Table 1 for definition of variables. 
 
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
 Obs. Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
Tobin's Q 173 1.0043 0.0853 0.9099 1.9738 
      
Market-To-Book Ratio 173 1.0049 0.4123 0.1448 2.5731 
      
Return On Assets 173 0.0113 0.0182 -0.0705 0.1971 
      
Return On Equity 173 0.0972 0.1073 -0.6911 0.4474 
      
Insider Ownership 173 0.0979 0.1183 0.0018 0.7641 
      
Size 173 15.6678 1.6961 13.4133 21.5412 
      
Capital 173 0.1117 0.0455 0.0626 0.6190 
      
Real Estate Loans 173 0.6937 0.1974 0.0393 1.0017 
      
Commercial And Industrial 
Loans 
173 0.1649 0.1115 0.0013 0.7057 
      
Consumer Loans 173 0.0698 0.0967 0.0000 0.6277 
      
Deposits 173 0.7302 0.1611 0.0131 0.9022 
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Table 3: Correlation matrices 
 
Table 3.1: 2005 Year  
	  
 
 
Notes: Please see Table 1 for definition of variables. 
 
 
 
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
 
 Tobin's 
Q 
Market-
To-Book 
Ratio 
Return 
On Assets 
Return 
On Equity 
Insider 
Ownership 
Size Capital Real 
Estate 
Loans 
Commercial 
And 
Industrial 
Loans 
Consumer 
Loans 
Deposits 
Tobin's Q 1.0000           
Market-To- 
Book Ratio 
0.4838 1.0000          
Return On 
Assets 
0.9467 0.3908 1.0000         
Return On 
Equity 
0.2831 0.7501 0.3904 1.0000        
Insider 
Ownership 
0.1345 0.1058 0.0698 0.0242 1.0000       
Size -0.0286 -0.1394 0.0681 0.0882 -0.3167 1.0000      
Capital 0.8393 0.0182 0.8572 -0.1050 0.0374 0.0169 1.0000     
Real Estate 
Loans 
-0.3018 -0.1860 -0.3165 -0.1458 0.1743 -0.3662 -0.2411 1.0000    
Commercial 
And 
Industrial 
Loans 
0.0200 0.1030 0.0302 0.0900 -0.0508 -0.0418 -0.0316 -0.4917 1.0000   
Consumer 
Loans 
0.4800 0.0296 0.5102 -0.0192 -0.1148 0.2877 0.5441 -0.5844 -0.0351 1.0000  
Deposits -0.2228 0.1261 -0.2267 0.0602 0.1318 -0.6377 -0.2574 0.2960 0.2906 -0.2773 1.0000 
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Table 3.2: 2008 Year 
	  
	  
	  
	  
Notes: Please see Table 1 for definition of variables. 
 
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
 
 Tobin's 
Q 
Market-
To- Book 
Ratio 
Return 
On 
Assets 
Return 
On 
Equity 
Insider 
Ownership 
Size Capital Real 
Estate 
Loans 
Commercial 
And 
Industrial 
Loans 
Consumer 
Loans 
Deposits 
Tobin's Q 1.0000           
Market-To- 
Book Ratio 
0.9227 1.0000          
Return On 
Assets 
0.4034 0.3337 1.0000         
Return On 
Equity 
0.2906 0.2775 0.9685 1.0000        
Insider 
Ownership 
0.0952 0.0773 0.0679 0.0618 1.0000       
Size -0.3521 -0.3440 -0.1409 -0.1027 -0.2757 1.0000      
Capital 0.1315 -0.1389 0.2029 0.0712 -0.0747 -0.0509 1.0000     
Real Estate 
Loans 
-0.1123 -0.0598 -0.1738 -0.1507 0.1537 -0.4516 -0.1052 1.0000    
Commercial 
And 
Industrial 
Loans 
-0.0738 -0.0574 0.0237 0.0281 0.0218 0.1151 -0.0074 -0.6111 1.0000   
Consumer 
Loans 
0.1204 0.1450 0.1187 0.1297 -0.1633 0.2739 0.0127 -0.4352 -0.0360 1.0000  
Deposits -0.0241 0.0909 -0.1050 -0.0792 0.2306 -0.5837 -0.1078 0.3109 0.0763 0.0127 1.0000 
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Table 3.3: 2011 Year 
	  
	  
	  
 
Notes: Please see Table 1 for definition of variables. 
 
 
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
 
 Tobin's Q Market-
To- Book 
Ratio 
Return 
On 
Assets 
Return 
On 
Equity 
Insider 
Ownership 
Size Capital Real Estate 
Loans 
Commercial 
And 
Industrial 
Loans 
Consumer 
Loans 
Deposits 
Tobin's Q 1.0000           
Market-To- 
Book Ratio 
0.7205 1.0000          
Return On 
Assets 
0.8000 0.4589 1.0000         
Return On 
Equity 
0.3375 0.4349 0.7225 1.0000        
Insider 
Ownership 
0.1524 0.0615 0.2235 0.1570 1.0000       
Size -0.0663 -0.1842 0.0262 0.0207 -0.2919 1.0000      
Capital 0.7176 0.1981 0.7039 0.0973 0.0989 0.0207 1.0000     
Real Estate 
Loans 
-0.1873 -0.0501 -0.1963 -0.0916 0.2395 -0.5746 -0.2304 1.0000    
Commercial 
And Industrial 
Loans 
-0.0536 0.0293 -0.0882 -0.0486 -0.2000 0.1786 0.0034 -0.5213 1.0000   
Consumer 
Loans 
0.3790 0.1091 0.3943 0.1424 -0.0189 0.2251 0.4149 -0.5029 -0.0924 1.0000  
Deposits -0.2173 0.0344 -0.2938 -0.1379 0.1187 -0.5846 -0.2981 0.4979 0.0784 -0.2359 1.0000 
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Table 4: Regression results 
 
 
Table 4.1: 2005 Year	   	  
	  
 Tobin’s Q Market-To- 
Book Ratio 
Return On 
Assets 
Return On 
Equity 
Insider 
Ownership 
 
0.0543* 
(0.1654) 
3.2829* 
(1.3445) 
0.0542* 
(0.0231) 
0.0979 
(0.1396) 
Insider 
Ownership 
Squared 
 
-0.7961* 
(0.3042) 
-5.3592* 
(2.4733) 
-0.0539 
(0.0403) 
-0.0969 
(0.2569) 
Size 
 
 
-0.0034 
(0.0067) 
-0.0148 
(0.0539) 
0.0000 
(0.0008) 
0.0106 
(0.0056) 
Capital 
 
 
2.3347* 
(0.1514) 
0.7080 
(1.2305) 
0.2433* 
(0.0251) 
-0.0316 
(0.1278) 
Real Estate 
Loans 
 
-0.1609* 
(0.0616) 
-1.9346* 
(0.5008) 
-0.0032 
(0.0103) 
-0.1381* 
(0.0520) 
Commercial 
And 
Industrial 
Loans 
 
-0.0368 
(0.0884) 
-1.2573 
(0.7190) 
0.0089 
(0.0138) 
-0.1044 
(0.0747) 
Consumer 
Loans 
 
-0.0767 
(0.1055) 
-1.5306 
(0.8575) 
0.0190 
(0.0150) 
-0.1433 
(0.0891) 
Deposits 
 
 
-0.0193 
(0.0634) 
1.0017 
(0.5158) 
-0.0115 
(0.0093) 
0.1234* 
(0.0536) 
Observations 
 
167 167 167 167 
R-squared 0.7470 0.1496 0.7573 0.0845 
 
	  
Notes: The numbers in parentheses are standard errors. * indicates statistical significance at 
the 5% level. Please see Table 1 for definition of variables. 
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Table 4.2: 2008 Year 
	  
	  
 Tobin’s Q Market-To- 
Book Ratio 
Return On 
Assets 
Return On 
Equity 
Insider 
Ownership 
 
0.1033 
(0.1131) 
0.1986 
(1.1337) 
0.0055 
(0.0390) 
0.0139 
(0.4668) 
Insider 
Ownership 
Squared 
 
-0.1259 
(0.1995) 
-0.2557 
(2.000) 
0.0196 
(0.0688) 
0.2749 
(0.8236) 
Size 
 
 
-0.0310* 
(0.0041) 
-0.2771* 
(0.0411) 
-0.0057* 
(0.0014) 
-0.0554* 
(0.0169) 
Capital 
 
 
0.0386 
(0.1454) 
-4.9346* 
(1.4573) 
0.0880 
(0.0502) 
0.0905 
(0.6000) 
Real Estate 
Loans 
 
-0.1735* 
(0.0503) 
-1.4175* 
(0.5046) 
0.0319 
(0.0174) 
-0.2841 
(0.2078) 
Commercial 
And 
Industrial 
Loans 
 
-0.1383* 
(0.0637) 
-1.0874 
(0.6385) 
-0.0111 
(0.0220) 
-0.0638 
(0.2629) 
Consumer 
Loans 
 
0.1367 
(0.0843) 
1.5611 
(0.8453) 
0.0390 
(0.0291) 
0.5072 
(0.3480) 
Deposits 
 
 
-0.1527* 
(0.0457) 
-0.9283* 
(0.4583) 
-0.0407* 
(0.0158) 
-0.4086* 
(0.1887) 
Observations 
 
166 166 166 166 
R-squared 0.3510 0.2971 0.1781 0.1090 
 
 
Notes: The numbers in parentheses are standard errors. * indicates statistical significance at the 5% 
level. Please see Table 1 for definition of variables. 
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Table 4.3: 2011 Year 
	  
	  
 Tobin’s Q Market-To- 
Book Ratio 
Return On 
Assets 
Return On 
Equity 
Insider 
Ownership 
 
0.1782 
(0.1080) 
-0.0886 
(0.7407) 
0.0542* 
(0.0231) 
0.2571 
(0.1957) 
Insider 
Ownership 
Squared 
 
-0.2486 
(0.1891) 
0.1811 
(1.2963) 
-0.0539 
(0.0403) 
-0.1956 
(0.3425) 
Size 
 
 
-0.0064 
(0.0040) 
-0.0714* 
(0.0273) 
0.0000 
(0.0008) 
-0.0032 
(0.0072) 
Capital 
 
 
1.2161* 
(0.1178) 
1.4193 
(0.8075) 
0.2433* 
(0.0251) 
-0.0447 
(0.2134) 
Real Estate 
Loans 
 
-0.0545 
(0.0486) 
-0.3823 
(0.3331) 
-0.0032 
(0.0104) 
-0.0240 
(0.0880) 
Commercial 
And 
Industrial 
Loans 
 
-0.0569 
(0.0647) 
-0.0487 
(0.4434) 
-0.0089 
(0.0138) 
-0.0047 
(0.1172) 
Consumer 
Loans 
 
0.0550 
(0.0703) 
0.0796 
(0.4818) 
0.0190 
(0.0150) 
0.1182 
(0.1273) 
Deposits 
 
 
-0.0191 
(0.0435) 
0.0200 
(0.2980) 
-0.0115 
(0.0093) 
-0.1025 
(0.0788) 
Observations 
 
173 173 173 173 
R-squared 0.5506 
 
0.0954 0.5514 0.0667 
 
Notes: The numbers in parentheses are standard errors. * indicates statistical significance at 
the 5% level. Please see Table 1 for definition of variables. 
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